Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Rights-based approaches : a framework for analysis -- The EU's development policy post-2020 : continuity or change? -- Rights-based vanguards? : paradoxes in the like-minded member-states' aid effectiveness policy -- The EU's human rights clause : 25 years of aid conditionality -- Rights-based approaches and vulnerable groups : the case of LGBTI human rights -- Norm collision in the EU's approach to Rwanda -- Conclusion : the EU's development policy in a shifting global order.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Tables -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 EU Development Policy Revisited -- 1.2 A Global Political Justice Approach -- 1.3 What We Know - and Why We Need to Move our Knowledge Forward -- 1.4 The EU's Rights-Based Approach: a Primer -- 1.5 EU Development Policy at a Crossroads -- 1.6 Methodology and Structure of the Book -- Notes -- References -- 2 Rights-based Approaches: A Framework for Analysis -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Rights-based Approaches to Development -- 2.3 A Turn Not Taken: Justice and the Role of Human Rights in Development -- 2.4 A Global Political Justice Perspective -- 2.4.1 Globalised Sovereignty: the Republican Proposition of Justice as Non-Domination -- 2.4.2 Securing Individual Autonomy: Global Justice as Impartiality -- Criteria -- Operationalisation -- Weaknesses -- 2.4.3 Recognising Difference Through Justice as Mutual Recognition -- Criteria -- Operationalisation -- Weaknesses -- 2.5 Accounting for the EU's Policies: Interpretation and Application of Human Rights Norms -- 2.5.1 Interpretation of Human Rights: Justificatory and Applicatory Discourses -- 2.6 Concluding Remarks -- Notes -- References -- 3 The EU's Development Policy Post-2020: Continuity or Change? -- 3.1 Instrumentalisation of EU Development Policy? -- 3.2 Rights-based Approaches: Reconciling Human Rights Protection With a Participatory Process -- 3.2.1 Operationalisation and Methodology -- 3.3 Change Or Continuity in the EU´s Rights-Based Approach? -- 3.3.1 The EU's Rights-Based Approach: Conditionality and the Cotonou Acquis -- 3.3.2 Post-Cotonou: a Weakening of Human Rights Commitments? -- A Participatory Process? -- 3.4 Limits to the EU's Rights-Based Approach -- 3.5 Conclusion -- Notes -- References.

The European Union (EU) is the world's biggest donor of aid to developing countries. The provision of EU aid is conditional on respect for human rights and democratic principles in the recipient countries. This article questions to what extent norms always yield to interests in decisions over whether to sanction breaches of human rights and democracy. Building on a theory that allows the simultaneous consideration of different norms, the article suggests that rather than interests being the determining factor when the EU takes decisions on implementing sanctions, the weighing of various norms and the choice to follow one of them can explain why sanctions have been avoided in certain cases in Rwanda. The article shows that this weighing of different norms plays an important role in foreign policy decisions and can have concrete consequences with regard to sanctions. In so doing, it advances the literature on the EU's global role by developing a theoretical account of the evaluation process and the ultimate decision to act in accordance with one norm in particular.

This article aims to enrich the literature on EU sanctions in two ways. First, it argues that the absence of material sanctions does not imply a non-response. When faced with human rights violations, policymakers enjoy a third option besides exerting material pressure or refraining from intervening. They may instead employ what constructivist scholars call social sanctions. This option consists of verbally calling out the violators, either publicly, through a naming-and-shaming strategy, or diplomatically via political dialogue and demarches. Social sanctions can be a credible alternative or complement to material sanctions. Second, we argue for the importance of disaggregating the EU as a sender of sanctions. A non-response by executive institutions does not mean that the EU as a whole is standing idly by. Looking at social sanctions alongside material ones more accurately describes the choices policymakers face when designing their response to human rights violations. We demonstrate the value of our arguments by examining the EU's various responses to LGBTI rights violations in Lithuania and Uganda.